Introduction
In an influential article, entitled ' Atheism: Contem por ary Numbers and Patterns' , Phil Zuckerman (2007) estimates that Finland is seventh on the list of most atheist countries in the world. According to sur veys examined in his article, there are approximately 28-60 per cent of 'atheists/agnostics/those who do not believe in a personal God' in Finland. How is it possible to make sense of such a variety in percent age? The numbers start to make more sense when we make a distinction between atheism and other non religious positions and also study beliefs, behaviour, membership and identification both separately and together. This reveals that even though the Finns are fairly nonreligious according to certain criteria, atheism is relatively unpopular in Finland. 1 However, atheism has become more visible in the public sphere, especi ally in the media. Some suggestions will be of fered as to why this is the case. This will be done by using different kinds of data, both quantitative (sur veys) and qualitative (mainly media outputs).
This paper proceeds as follows. First, surveys about Finnish religiosity and atheism will be exam ined in order to chart the modes and locations of Finnish nonreligiosity. This section is based on a fairly detailed exploration of surveys, including an examination of the popularity of religious beliefs, re ligious behaviour, membership and identification in Finland. It demonstrates that atheism is relatively un popular in Finland, despite the low level of religious activity. In order to examine why this is the case, pub lic discourses on atheism will then be examined. This part of the paper is based on the analysis of media material from the end of the Second World War to the present day. If the previous section has revealed that despite the relatively high level of nonreligiosity in the country, people are not keen on identifying them selves as atheists, the one following will take the form of an exploration as to why that might be the case. The main argument in this section is that historically atheism has not been considered to be part of what it is to be a proper Finn. Even though atheism has been established later as a possible alternative among other identities, it is not fully accepted if it is con nected to an explicitly antireligious standpoint. The final section will explore the implementation of the socalled 'New Atheism' in Finland. As New Athe ism is known for provocative statements connected to public campaigning and consciousnessraising, its implementation to some extent marks a new phase in the Finnish discourse on atheism. A recent debate on New Atheism has made atheism more visible, but it will be suggested that this increased visibility is not the same as increased popularity.
Methodologically this paper attempts to demon strate how important it is to use a variety of meth odologies and different kinds of data if we want to achieve a proper understanding of atheism in a spe cific location. While the results received from sur veys are important, a plausible interpretation of why the numbers are as they are requires study of other kinds of materials. Hence, if nonreligion 'can only be specified within a given social and cultural context' (Campbell 1971: 29) , then it is necessary to examine the nature of atheism and nonreligion in a more de tailed manner. This is how the idea of Finland as the seventh most atheist country in the world is made in telligible and also challenged.
Atheism and non-religiosity in Finland according to surveys

Beliefs
The study of beliefs is common in measuring religi osity or the lack of it. If the options are yes or no, approximately 17-26 per cent of Finns do not believe in God, but with only two options, the numbers of 'don't know' and 'no answer' increase (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 ISSP 2008) . According to surveys with more options, approximately 30-45 per cent believe in a Christian God or as 'the church teaches' , while 22-30 per cent believe something different. There are 6-11 per cent who deny the existence of God, while 4-5 per cent doubt the existence of God. 13-18 per cent are undecided. Thus, altogether 25-33 per cent are not convinced of the existence of some kind of God, but approximately 10 per cent are explicitly atheists. (Fig. 1.) A more recent survey from 2008 reveals that 11.1 per cent do not believe in God and almost 40 per cent can be classified as nonbelievers, agnostics and those who doubt. Still, 46.4 per cent say they believe in God. (ISSP 2008.) By using beliefs as criteria, athe ism is not a default position of the Finns and there has not been a substantial increase in disbelief in re cent years.
Belief in God is quite an abstract question, which is why it is useful to focus on more detailed and con crete questions too. The results in this case show that negative answers increase drastically: according to surveys from 1996 and 2000, more than third do not believe in heaven and life after death, more than half do not believe in hell and approximately 50 per cent do not believe in the existence of the devil. (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 According to a survey from 2008, more than 40 per cent do not believe in heaven and life af ter death, but the percentage is not fully comparable to earlier ones as the alternatives in the questions were different (ISSP 2008) .
The level of disbelief increases even more in rela tion to claims that are distant from Christian teach ings and doctrines (such as belief in witchcraft, UFOs, astrology, horoscopes, Tarot) (see GE 1995; CM 1999 CM , 2004 . This is not surprising, but it shows that disbelief in Christian teachings and doctrines is not replaced by nonChristian supernatural beliefs. The more abstract and established the Christian be lief, the more it has support. The hierarchy of reli gious beliefs among the Finns from popular to less popular is as follows:
• Abstract Christian beliefs (6-26 % say they do not believe, while 25-40 % lack explicit belief) • Concrete Christian beliefs (30-45 % do not be lieve) • Concrete, popular/folk Christian beliefs (40-60 % do not believe) • Concrete, popular/folk nonChristian beliefs (65-85 % do not believe) Figure 1 . Belief in the existence of God: 'Do you believe in the existence of God?' (GE 1999 (GE , 2003 CM 2002 CM , 2004 By examining many surveys it becomes obvious that there is a great deal of variety in answers in different years and that the change is by no means unilinear. Furthermore, the available options have an impact on the results. Therefore, these results are indicative rather than conclusive. However, they show that the level of explicit atheistic belief is fairly low, whereas the level of a lack of explicit religious belief is relative ly high. This suggests that in terms of beliefs the Finns are neither very religious nor explicitly atheistic.
Practice (behaviour) -collective and private
Beliefs are not the only variable to be measured. It is possible that people do not believe, but still par ticipate in religious activities (and vice versa). There fore, belief is not to be taken as the only, or even the primary criterion for measuring religiosity; it is one dimension among others. Typically church attendance has been used for measuring religious behaviour. In Finland -as in many other countries -people go to church during rites of passage (weddings, funerals, baptism) and calendar rites (mainly Easter and Christmas). Be yond these, approximately 70 per cent attend the ser vice a maximum of once a year and 45-50 per cent say they never or rarely do it (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 (WVS , 2005 CM 2002 CM , 2004 . However, 21 per cent say they at tend the church at Easter or Christmas (WVS 2000) . When asked about other churchrelated activities, such as smallgroup gatherings, concerts, camps and trips, more than 85 per cent attend rarely or not at all (GE 1995 (GE , 1999 (GE , 2003 . On the basis of these results it can be argued that Finnish people are very passiveand perhaps indifferent -when it comes to collective religious practices.
The frequency of praying has been a typical cri terion for measuring private religious behaviour. Approximately 30-40 per cent of Finns pray either very rarely or not at all and praying is rare for half of the population. However, the other half says they pray actively (35 %) or casually (15 %). Of other private practices, uses of religious media as well as Biblereading have been researched. Approximately 45-60 per cent of Finns either rarely or never follow religious television, radio or newspapers and slightly over 60 per cent say they either rarely or never read the Bible. (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 GE 1995 GE , 1999 GE , 2003 If rites of passage are excluded, private religious behav iour is more popular than collective practice, but the overall tendency is clear: Finnish people are passive also in private religious behaviour, despite the rela tive popularity of praying. (Ketola et al. 2007: 53-4) . However, the trend is clear: by using membership as a criterion, Finland has become more nonreligious.
Membership
Despite the decline in membership, Finnish people have a positive attitude towards the dominant church institutions, both the EvangelicalLutheran Church of Finland and the Orthodox Church of Fin land. Only 5 per cent have a negative attitude. Even though Finnish people's attitudes tend to be posi tive, they are less inclined to think that the churches have solutions to problems related to morality, fam ily, social issues and 'spiritual' issues. 3 People have some trust in the church institutions: only 6-9 per cent show total distrust and 29-36 per cent do not trust much, but 43-50 per cent trust pretty much and 11-13 per cent very much. (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 (WVS , 2005 When membership and participation are exam ined simultaneously it is possible to say that Finnish people are 'belonging without practising' . Despite the declining membership, many Finnish people are still happy to be part of the Lutheran Church and pay taxes while not using any services. However, many people appreciate that the services are there if they feel the need to use them. Perhaps more import antly, services are there for others. Of course there are many stated reasons for being a member of the Lutheran Church -and only one of them is directly related to religious beliefs. The most important ones are the maintenance of cemeteries, rites of passage and domestic social work. The Church is also seen as maintaining Finnish traditions (of which it is a part). The opportunity to have a church wedding is im portant, as well as that of being a Churchrecognised godparent, but the ability of the Church to support belief in God and a chance to participate in congrega tional activities are not significant factors according to surveys. (GE 1995 (GE , 1999 (GE , 2003 CM 1999 CM , 2004 In order to understand the Finnish context, it is im portant to emphasise that membership is a way to be available for others and to be part of Finnish society (with which the Lutheran Church is intertwined both in actual practice and in the people's imaginations). The surveys offer some evidence for this interpreta tion, but there is also anecdotal evidence of people who stress the importance of this aspect, especially in cases where people join the Lutheran Church because friends or relatives have asked them to be Church recognised godparents for their children. Even the short letter the Lutheran Church sends to those who resign their membership contains a reminder that nonmembers are not able to become Church recognised godparents. 4 Together the stated reasons for being a member show that Church membership is still an important means of being part of an imagined Finnish community for many. Therefore, atheistic be liefs and a lack of religious behaviour do not lead to the resignation of membership in any direct manner. 4 Here we see an obvious connection to what Grace Davie (2007) has called 'vicarious religion' , but there is no space here to deal with it properly. My sugges tion would be that it is not that some people (such as pastors) believe for others, but that ordinary people think that the Church institution is important for oth ers and therefore they are willing to support its exist ence by maintaining membership. By being willing to support it, people also make themselves available for others. My guess is that if people would be content with nonreligious weddings, funerals, namegiving and godparenting, it would be the end of the Luther an Church in Finland as we know it.
Identification
Even though Finland has become more nonreligious in many respects, this does not automatically mean that it has become more atheistic. The suggestion here is that atheism should not be analysed only as a lack of theistic beliefs, a lack of participation in re ligious practices and a lack of formal membership in religious associations. It is also crucial to focus on atheism as an identity tag and separate it from other nonreligious positions. According to the surveys explored here, the popu larity of atheism as an identity tag has been quite steady. Even if earlier surveys from 1981 and 1990 are taken into account, the results do not change: ap proximately three per cent of Finns identify them selves as atheists whereas almost 40 per cent of them consider themselves to be nonreligious ('not a reli gious person') ( fig. 2 ). The results change only when 'not a religious person' is not offered as an alternative. However, even then the number of atheists has been limited: it has varied from 3.8 per cent (GE 1995) to 5 per cent (CM 2007) to 12 per cent (CM 2004) .
When the popularity of atheism as an identity is compared to other Northern European Protes tant countries, it becomes clear that atheism is less popular in Finland. Sweden has 17 per cent atheists, the Netherlands has 7 per cent and Germany 5 per cent. The Finnish percentage (3 %) is closer to Catho lic countries (such as Mexico, Chile and Italy) and Orthodox Cyprus, but below the average (7 %) of all the countries that were included in the World Values Survey in 2005. According to this survey, it is only in Guatemala, Columbia, Poland and Romania (all 1 %) where it is more exceptional to identify as athe ist (Ketola et al. 2007: 55 Figure 2. Finnish religious identity: 'Do you consider yourself as religious person, non-religious or atheist?' (WVS 1996 (WVS , 2000 (WVS , 2005 study of various survey questions complicates the no tion of Finland as possibly the seventh most atheistic country in the world, the comparison of identifica tion challenges it directly. The survey results are not clear enough to say any thing definitive about education and income. The level of education is slightly above average and athe ists are to be found in all income categories. Their in come is not below that of religious people, but their classidentity is lower middleclass or working class -meaning that it is typical for Finnish atheists to identify with a lower class than their income would suggest. However, these observations are suggestive rather than conclusive. What is important here is that when the variables are compared to other countries, it is possible to see how the profile is quite similar to other European countries and North America. 6 Therefore, there are elements in atheism that are not limited to local contexts.
Profile of Finnish atheists
Atheism in Finnish public discourse
The surveys show that Finnish people are fairly non religious but not atheistic. As already suggested, this relatively low popularity of atheism is partly ex plained by the connection between Lutheranism and Finnishness: being Lutheran is still a significant part of being Finnish for many. This connection -and its relation to atheism -can be further explored by analysing the public discourse on atheism in Fin land from the end of the Second World War to the present day. The analysis of the most influential and widespread Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, will demonstrate that atheism has been historically associated with antiFinnishness and although that association is changing, it is still one reason for the relative unpopularity of atheism. 7
From atheism as 'other' to atheism as 'an alternative' According to the newspaper material examined here, atheism is not a visible concept in public discourse before the 1960s and the 1970s. 8 At the end of the 1960s atheism was seen mainly as a foreign phenom enon, associated with the communist systems of the Soviet Union and China, and therefore atheists were seen as foreign others.
In the 1970s the atheism as a term started to fig ure more in public discourse. It did not refer only to foreign developments in communist countries, but became a domestic issue and the term was used as an identity tag. It was connected mainly to two po sitions: Marxist dialectical materialism and Darwin ism.
Dialectical materialism was more philosophy driven than Darwinism, which referred to natural sci ence, but representatives of both schools of thought were imagining themselves as defenders of the truth in the face of false religious propositions. However, during the early part of the 1970s the dominant voice in the discourse on atheism came from religious people. Atheism was criticised, especially when writ ings focused on the Soviet Union and 'atheist' often meant (a Finnish or Russian) 'communist' in public discourse. Atheists relying on 'scientific positivism' were classified into two groups: those who accepted the current 'system' (i.e. the role of Christianity in so ciety and its institutions) and those who wanted to destabilise it. The voice of the latter was not loud in early 1970s. Atheists were still seen as other, albeit a domestic other.
It was not until 1978 that the debate really took off. In the first part of that decade the discussion had been moderate and often focused on the context of schools and the privileged role of Lutherans in that area. However in 1978, over a threemonth period, Helsingin Sanomat received 266 letters dealing with atheism. It published more than 70 of them. Athe ists framed the debate around the binary opposition of religion and science; Christians suggested ways to synthesise religion and science. Atheists suggested that religion is false; others saw atheists as dubious people who deny the 'absolute truth' in moral issues.
In the early 1980s some atheists complained that they were being discriminated against in a pre dominantly Lutheran society, but the next peak in 8 Surely there have been critics of religion and the Lutheran Church throughout the examined period, but atheism was not a concept used in public debates in the 1940s and 1950s.
published letters was in 1988. Then the newspaper received 140 letters and published 28. This time the debate was about evolution. More than 14,000 people signed a petition letter that was initiated by the Pente costals and directed against the teaching of the theory of evolution in schools. The major standpoints in the debate are familiar even today: there were outspoken Darwinist atheists, creationists who opposed evolu tion and mainstream Lutherans who tried to find a compromise between religious beliefs and scientific knowledge.
In the early 1990s most atheistic letters focused on improving the situation of nonreligious people in society and its institutions. This has continued to the present day, but what has changed is that the dis course on diversity has gained more ground. In this discourse atheists are in a better position to make claims about their rights and their supposedly mar ginalised situation. While the rights of nonreligious people have been taken more into account than in many institutions previously, the idea of a fully secu lar state promoted by active atheists has not emerged.
As this historical sketch shows, atheism has been connected to communism and Darwinism in public discourse. While the first connection has been un derstood as an antiFinnish position, the latter has been accepted in a form that does not oppose all re ligiosity and does not take overtly aggressive forms. Historically, atheism has transformed from the posi tion of the 'other' to one alternative among many in a slightly more diverse Finland. As an alternative it is more variant than deviant, especially in urban areas. However, whenever there are atheistic statements and campaigns against religious people, many non religious and otherwise religiously indifferent people tend to go against atheists, as they are seen to be needlessly provocative in relation to FinnoLutheran traditions and its cultural heritage.
Towards a normalisation of atheism
Even though the understanding of atheism has changed from being the other of Lutheran Finnish ness to being a possible alternative, it has not become a completely normalised position. This can be dem onstrated by examining public discourse on religion and atheism in connection with Finnish Presidents.
In the USA the political careers of publicly atheist politicians seem to stop before the top. For example, according to a Gallup Poll taken in 2006, 84 per cent of the Americans thought that the USA is not ready to elect an atheist for President (Keysar 2007: 33) . A Gallup Poll from 1999 reveals that only 49 per cent said they could vote for an atheist for President. In comparison, 90 per cent answered that they could vote black, female or Jew and 59 per cent said they could vote homosexual. (Edgell et al. 2006: 215.) In the UK politicians have more opportunities to state their atheism in public without jeopardising their political careers. It was only a slight exaggera tion when Rachel Sylvester (2008) wrote in The Times that it is easier for an atheist politician to come out of the closet than for a believer to confess his/her religi osity. Many top politicians have said that they are not believers. When the current Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of LiberalDemocratic party, Nick Clegg, said in an interview in 2007 that he does not believe in God, it did not mark the end of his politic al career and it did not ruin the support of the party he leads. However, after the interview he stated that he is married to a Catholic woman and is committed to bringing his children up as Catholics, moreover that he respects religious people and has an open at titude towards religious issues. (BBC News 2007, see also Bullivant 2010 and Bagg & Voas 2010 .) The case shows that while it is not necessary to be a believer, it is important to have a positive, 'open' and 'respectful' attitude towards religions and religious people, com bined with the approval of separation of religion and politics. The Prime Minister David Cameron is an ex ample of a top politician's ideal attitude: he considers himself as a religious person, but says that his faith is like a magical radio channel which changes from quiet to a bit louder and quiet again, depending on the situation (quiet in public 'political' issues, louder in personal and moral issues).
Finland is a different case, but here I want to highlight the similarities between Finland and the UK. In both countries the ideal attitude is the same: religious rhetoric and justification are not at all desir able in everyday politics, but moderate religiosity is associated with honesty, morality, tradition and com munity. Furthermore, expressing a negative attitude towards the dominant churches would not be a wise strategic move. At the same time both countries see themselves as fairly secular. However, it is difficult for an explicit atheist to be elected as the President of Finland.
After the Second World War there have been many debates in which the religiosity of the President has been an issue, but none of the Presidents have identified themselves as atheists. For instance, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, who was the Finnish President from 1956 to 1982, had a strategic approach and a fairly distant attitude to the Lutheran Church in pub lic, but his private religiosity was not questioned (Nii ranen 2000: 46). His follower, Mauno Koivisto, called himself a 'Protestant Christian' and was the son of an ecumenical Adventist, but his public policy towards the Lutheran Church and religious matters was not very different from that of his predecessor. (Koivisto 1998; Räisänen 2006: 203-11.) In 1994 when Martti Ahtisaari beat Elisabeth Rehn in the second round of the election, the question of the candidates' re ligiosity was seen as important. In an entertainment programme on television, which gathered almost two million viewers, Ahtisaari's answer to the ques tion concerning belief in God was more affirmative than Rehn's. If this really was a crucial issue, it tells us that the positive attitude towards religious (mainly Lutheran) matters is seen as a virtue in the nation's leader. At least the issue was debated in newspapers afterwards and Rehn attempted to change tack, and revised her comments saying that she believed deeply in God.
Tarja Halonen became the President of Finland after Ahtisaari in 2000. The discourse on religion re lated to her exemplifies the continuation of old pref erences and the emergence of new opportunities. She has not only been the first female President of Fin land, but also the first who is not a member of the Lutheran Church. However, her nonreligiosity and the fact that she was not married (although in a rela tionship) during her campaign prompted a lively de bate. This debate is an example of the importance of traditional values. For instance, Bishop Jorma Laulaja expressed his view that Halonen should be married. He saw her nonmarriage as a public statement and added that he also felt uneasy about the fact that she was not a member of the Lutheran Church. Helsingin Sanomat published similar views expressed by lay people, who saw the position of the President as a role model for others. The debate did not continue for long, because Halonen got married after she was elected as President.
Despite the fact that Halonen is not a church member, she has not been antireligious, nor has she acted as a spokesperson for atheists. In her pub lic statements she maintains that the position of the Lutheran Church in Finnish society is justified and she also connects the Church to traditional Finn ishness. Furthermore, she has been fairly active in supporting political initiatives which have a posi tive attitude toward religious diversity. Moreover, before her presidency she was chair of the Finnish Settlement Movement, which is based on Christian values. Halonen's case demonstrates that Lutheran ism is connected to Finnishness. It is expected that the leader of the nation does not diverge too much from the ideal. 9 The case also shows that the connec tion has somewhat loosened, as it has been possible to become the President of Finland without being a member of the Lutheran Church. However, it is more difficult if the candidate is explicitly atheist and anti religious. This demonstrates that while Finland is a rather nonreligious country in many ways, it would be implausible to argue that atheism is a fully nor malised position -at least if it is combined with anti religious approach. 10
The implementation of 'New Atheism' in Finland
The longitudinal examination of public discourse revealed changes in Finnish 'atheism' . It is not prob lematic to be an atheist if it is based on the premise of 'live and let others live' , but whenever atheism is seen as militant, provocative or something that chal lenges the existing role of the Lutheran Church in so ciety and the existence of Christianbased traditions in schools or other public institutions, the response is negative. This is the background for understand ing the implementation of 'New Atheism' in Finland: some people see their message relating to the USA only, but those who campaign actively for the rights of nonreligious people and want to diminish the role of religion in public institutions have welcomed the 9 The presidential campaign of early 2012 does not make a difference to the analysis offered here. The cur rent President, Sauli Niinistö, is not known to be very religious, but he is a member of the Lutheran Church and he cooperates with church leaders in some institutions (Kirkon diakoniarahasto and the Tukikummit foundation). His rival in the second round was Pekka Haavisto, who is openly homosexual and not a member of any religious association. Even though the religiosity of the candidates was not as significant a topic as sexual orientation in the media debates during the election, it was common to hear people referring to the religious difference between the candidates, at least in the more conservative and religious areas of Finland. 10 This conclusion, based on the analysis of public discourse shows, in accordance with survey informa tion on attitudes towards atheists, that the attitude is negative rather than positive, but predominantly neutral. criticism of religion put forward by the New Athe ists. Therefore, the implementation of New Atheism marks to some extent a new phase in Finland as it has encouraged people to be more critical of religion publicly and to argue for the moral and intellectual superiority of atheism more loudly than before. The public debate concerning atheism has become more visible in recent years. That is to say, at least, references to 'atheism' and 'atheist' have increased in Helsingin Sanomat (fig. 3) 11 The translated responses are discussed relatively little in public, partly because they have not been published by major publishers, but rather more or less religious ones. The agenda of the Finnish publisher of three New Atheist bestsell ers, Terra Cognita, is to popularise natural science (and promote it over 'social constructionism' , 'post modern relativism' and religion). 12 The international discourse on religion and athe ism is organised around two camps: on the one side there are the New Atheists and others who anchor themselves in the natural sciences, arguing that re ligion is wrong in its claims to truth and also harm ful; on the other side there are educated, mostly male, liberal theologians who argue that at least Christian ity has been and still is a force for good and has an intellectually defensible position. This is the case in Finland as well. The loudest critics of religion are all relying on the natural sciences and the theory of evo lution, while short responses have been written by fairly liberal Lutheran, male, Bishops such as Eero Huovinen (2008) The discussion of New Atheism became a prop erly public issue after Bishop Huovinen's short article. Some responses were printed with less publicity, but the first really visible defence of New Atheism was written by a scholar of religion, Matti Kamppinen, whose article was published in Helsingin Sanomat in March 2009. It was part of the 'Sunday Debate' se ries in which articles receive 200 comments, on aver age, on the newspaper's website. Kamppinen's article gathered more than 1,000 comments. Even though the focus of the topic shifted further from the origin al article in the responses, the number of comments tells its own story about the interest in religion/athe ism debate. 14 The implementation of the concept of New Athe ism in Finland has taken place in these widespread, highquality publications, but it has been partly a continuation of an earlier debate between religion and science. Even before the discourse on New Athe ism, popular discussion books, where one voice rep resents Lutheran religion and the other the natural sciences, have been published. Bishop Juha Pihkala and professor of astronomy Esko Valtaoja debated for and against religion in 2004 (Pihkala & Valtaoja 2004) . The equally popular sequel was published in 2010, including comments on and references to 'New Atheism' (Pihkala & Valtaoja 2010) . A year later an other book containing a discussion within a similar frame was published. This time Jaakko Heinimäki, a tensive and positive coverage in the media as the ones by the theological elite. For example, when Bishop Huovinen published his defence of Christianity against New Atheism in a respected semiacademic journal, it was considered as news in many daily newspapers, but Eskola's and Ojanen's publisher is a minor one, known to be supportive of conservative Lutheranism. There are some voices that support the views of radical theology (Nevanlinna & Relander 2011) , but as they are not dominating the discussion, I will leave them unexplored here. 14 A year later a doctoral student, Ilse Paakkinen (2010) published in the same newspaper an article that prompted a lively debate. She argued that the substance of New Atheism is limited to a criticism of religion and hence it does not offer anything con structive for people who reject religion. Her argument was not unlike that of those who represent the dis course of the theological elite, but she received plenty of critical feedback in the discussion forum, perhaps partly because of her gender, relatively young age, position as 'only' a PhD candidate, but also because she was described as being a member of the centre of excellence at the University of Helsinki which in the popular imagination represents scientific rationality.
wellknown public figure and liberal Lutheran Pas tor represented a theologically refined position and the exchair of the Union of Freethinkers of Finland, Jussi K. Niemelä, represented the position which is critical of religion and opposes it on the basis of the theory of evolution, scientific rationality and human rights (Heinimäki & Niemelä 2011) . In all the exam ples given above, the debate is framed as a struggle between natural science and religion. Finnish public intellectuals have been selective in their support of the socalled New Atheists. None of the key spokespersons have identified themselves as such. Furthermore, some arguments have been dubbed as nonsense. However, at the same time they use many ideas popularised by Dawkins and others. One of the most popular and bestknown critics of religion is a professor of cosmology, Kari Enqvist, whose key message is that there is essentially noth ing that natural science leaves unexplained (Enqvist 1998) . Therefore, there is no place for religion (as it is understood by him as a rival for scientific knowl edge). He claims to be nonreligious and totally in different rather than an atheist, but his continuing criticism of religion proves otherwise. He does not agree with Dawkins and others on everything, but he makes use of their analyses. For instance, by follow ing Dawkins and Dennett he writes about religion as a virus of the mind that makes people act in a strange manner and he also refers to religion as a meme. (En qvist 2009.) 15 15 One of the key differences between Enqvist and the socalled New Atheists is that he does not see disen chantment as a significant problem. He does not em phasise the beauty and wonders of nature as a source for achieving reenchantment in a godless world, as
The aforementioned critic of religion Esko Valta oja confessed (jokingly, I suppose) that he was 'almost considering' joining the Lutheran Church after read ing Hitchens, but at the same time he believes, along with Dawkins, that religions are fairly dangerous and that scientific, social and moral progress obtained with the help of science is a fact (Pihkala & Valtaoja 2010: 21, 238, 255-64) . Exchair Jussi K. Niemelä, has promoted New Atheism more than anyone else in Finland and judged the forms of atheism that are not explicitly anchored in the natural sciences, but recently he has also argued, against the New Atheists, that moderate liberal religiosity is an ally for atheists rather than simply an object of criticism (Niemelä 2011: 72; Heinimäki & Niemelä 2011) .
Recently Ilkka Pyysiäinen, a scholar of religion, published a pamphlet God Does Not Exist! in Finn ish. Even though his book is not in any direct way dependent on the arguments of the New Atheists, it has been interpreted in the media as being part of the same phenomenon. Pyysiäinen is very critical of Har ris and fairly critical towards some ideas of Dawkins, but he shares with them at least two important views: he frames the debate as being between science and religion and he argues for the superiority of natural science over cultural research (Pyysiäinen 2011 , see also Pyysiäinen 2007 .
Despite this combination of denial and affirm ation, Finnish critics follow Dawkins and others in most socalled New Atheists do. Many atheists use the pictures taken by the Hubble telescope as examples of the wonders of nature and the scientific approach to the world, but Enqvist, while speaking for the natural sciences, sounds more laconic (and Finnish, perhaps) when he confesses that looking at the pictures gets boring after a while. (Enqvist 2009: 179.) Religion versus the natural sciences: the Lutheran Bishop Juha Pihkala and professor of astronomy Esko Valtaoja receiving an award for their book. Photo by Laura Oja.
Religion versus the natural sciences: Lutheran Pastor Jaakko Heinimäki and the ex-chair of The Union of Freethinkers Jussi K. Niemelä promoting their book.
anchoring their argument on the same natural scien tific basis and frame their narrative as a struggle between science and reli gion. Furthermore, they all share a hostile view of 'postmodernism' , 'social constructionism' and 'cul tural relativism' .
In addition to the published writings by critics and defenders of religion there are other examples of the increased visibility of atheism. Atheism has been picked up by the public broadcasting company, YLE, too. There have been television programmes in which the aforementioned public intellectuals (especi ally Valtaoja and Enqvist) have talked critic ally of (unscientific and 'irrational') religious views in order to highlight the superiority of natural sci ence and 'rationality' . 16 On the YLE radio station a talk programme called God Does Not Exist! ran from November 2010 to January 2011 and a typical show included guests with views for and against religion. The host, Tarja Koivumäki, was openly antireligious in her introductions to the programme's particular themes. The programme was unusually antireligious and proatheist in comparison to YLE's traditional approach. There have also been antireligious col umns on YLE radio (for example, 'The Anatomy of Religion' by Kirsi Virtanen, broadcast on 21st Sep tember 2011). 17 The radio shows were inspired by the New Atheists. There were direct references to them and most of the themes discussed were the ones ad dressed in bestselling books associated with them. For instance, one of the key points by Kirsi Virtanen was to suggest that children should not be given re ligious labels -an idea taken from The God Delusion and from the Don't Label Me billboard campaign sup The visibility of atheism and criticism of religion has also increased in the activities of registered as sociations. The Union of Freethinkers in Finland have copied international campaigns and received publicity. For instance, the atheist bus advertisement campaign that took place in Britain in January 2009 was also enacted in Finland in the same year. The following campaign was more provocative. In 2010 freethinkers organised an event where they swapped Bibles (and any kind of religious literature) for por nographic papers. The intended message was to point out that sexuality, repressed by some religious agents, is a positive thing. It is not surprising that some re ligious people felt offended and organised a counter campaign where a Christian bookstore exchanged pornographic magazines for Bibles, but what is more important is that many nonreligious people felt that this sort of provocation did not have any substance. Partly because the campaigns were seen as medi ated provocations and publicity stunts, they had lit tle impact on public policy debate. However, they have made freethinkers and atheists more visible in the public eye and after both the above mentioned campaigns the Union of Freethinkers received more paying members. The provocations have worked as consciousnessraising for some 'closet atheists' , but they have also alienated nonreligious people. For example, freethinkers from Tampere established a separ ate association after the 'swapping' campaign, now calling their association 'Equality of Convic tions' (or Equality of Worldviews -Vakaumusten tasaarvo). The main reason for this separation was that they want equal rights for nonreligious people without being disrespectful.
The key publications and campaigns would need a more serious examination than is possible here. However, this short analysis demonstrates how the discourse on atheism and religion has become more polarised. Every publication is followed by a response from the other side and every campaign is followed by a countercampaign. Therefore, there is an increasing visibility of both atheism and religion. They mutually enhance each other and the mass media has nothing against lively debates where there is no grey area but only black and white options. It is this polarised situ ation and an awareness of atheism that is 'new' , rather than intellectual positions and arguments of the de bate. 19 to socalled New Atheism, as local public intellectu als had already framed the public discussion on reli gion and atheism as being about irrational religion versus rational, natural sciences and promoted the latter as an antidote to the former. However, the New Atheism has intensified the debate and made atheism more visible.
Conclusion
The contextual analysis offered here has challenged and highlighted the complexity of the context be hind the idea of Finland as the seventh most athe ist country in the world. On the contrary; although the Finns are not religiously active, atheism is rela tively unpopular in Finland. This is especially true when atheism is understood as an identity tag. One of the main reasons for its limited popularity is that it has been historically associated with Soviet com munism and therefore it has not been considered to be an appropriately Finnish attribute. Recently athe ism has become more visible in Finland, and this has included an attempt to disarticulate atheism from communism and rearticulate atheism more strongly than before to Darwinism, the natural sciences and the theory of evolution. However, this has not meant that atheism has become significantly more popular: at least not yet. have a connection with secularisation or deseculari sation as such. The increase in visibility can happen within an accelerating secularisation, but it can also arise within desecularisation. In locations where ex pressions of religiosity or atheism are not suppressed by a coercive state apparatus, the visibility of one is likely to increase the visibility of the other. How ever, it is important for understanding this visibility to ascertain whether it happens within a context of secularisation or desecularisation. Northern Eur ope has become more secular according to tradi tional yardsticks such as the prevalence of religious beliefs, behaviour (especially church attendance), numbers of membership and appropriated identities, but globally -including Northern Europe -religion has become more visible. Furthermore, the norma tive place of religion in the earlier phase of moder nity was the private, nonpolitical sphere, whereas recently 'religion has come adrift of its former points of anchorage' (Beckford 1989: 170) and public uses of 'religion' have changed (Beckford 2003: 232) . As a consequence, we are witnessing the new visibility and awareness of religion (Hoelzl & Ward 2008: 2) and the new visibility of atheism at the same time. There are mass media events which have had a huge impact on the current situation, but there are also slower but no less significant processes, such as the development of electronic media technolo gies, liberalisation of media economies, increasing religious diversity through transnational migration (Herbert 2012 ) and the 'disembedding' of traditions established in the early phase of modernity. Anthony Giddens (1994 , Giddens & Pierson 1998 has argued that in principle none of the traditions, religious or otherwise, can rely on their established roles in so ciety; they have to justify their position at the level of public discourse. If his view is largely correct, it helps us understand the mutual visibility of atheism and religion at a time of the deregulation (and re regulation) of religion. In Finland one of the tradi tional bonds in need of rejustification is the connec tion between 'Finnishness' and the Lutheran Church in times of increased (religious and nonreligious) diversity. Highlighting the situation that requires dis cursive justification from all positions is not the only possible framework for interpreting the main obser vation made here -that atheism is relatively unpopu lar in Finland, but its visibility has increased -but it is the one I find most convincing.  Dr, Docent Teemu Taira holds a research fellowship from the Academy of Finland at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Turku, Finland. Currently he is studying media discourses on religion, atheism and the secular. Email: teetai(at)utu.fi.
